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This paper has been written as a contribution to the attainment of integration in the field of special recreation. 
It is an attempt to conceptualise recreation for the disabled against a background of the therapeutic model in 
order to stimulate debate on the matter. The intention of the argument is to present a description of therapy* 
and'recreation 'current in A ustralian society; to show that these concepts are fundamentally different to one 
another; and to conclude that the concepts cannot be combined in the manner demanded by therapeutic 
recreation. 
Over recent years in Australia, increasing 
concern has been expressed for the position of 
'special' populations, particularly the disabled, 
with respect to recreation. Services are being 
developed within specialised agencies, by general 
recreation organisations, by municipal councils, 
hospitals and other community centres, Courses 
are offered in a number of tertiary institutions, and 
governments at all levels are experiencing pressure 
to develop statements of policy on the subject. 
It is important that this movement grows rapidly 
in order to bridge a real gap in existing services, 
however it is also important that such growth is 
founded upon sound principles. Already within the 
area of tertiary courses for undergraduates and 
graduates in recreation there is evidence of 
divergence and even conflict in approach. This is 
not necessarily bad, and in fact, in a pluralist 
society, such diversity is to be expected. Neverthe-
less, the field will also benefit from a degree of 
integration at the conceptual level in order that 
growth can retain some degree of logical 
consistency and direction. 
To the person in the street, the concept of 
therapy conjures up a picture of a process which is 
directed at treating'or'correcting'individuals who 
have been defined as deviating in one way or 
another from the norms of society. Such deviance 
could include physical or mental disability, 
physical or mental illness, social deviance or even 
financial disadvantage. No matter what form this 
deviation from the norm takes, the appropriate 
process demanded by the traditional school of 
therapy is to direct action at the individual — to 
re-build the client. 
There is, however, developing a school which 
says that such a view of treatment is no longer 
appropriate in all circumstances. This alternative 
view demands that we do not label the individual's 
behaviour or condition as being deviant until it is 
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assessed against the norm demanded by society. 
When such a comparison is made, we are then free 
to conclude that it may be the society's standards 
which should be considered pathological, and that 
the individual's condition would not be labelled 
deviant were society's view of normality broader 
and more flexible than it is at present. 
The technique of cultural comparison developed 
by anthropology can make a valuable contribution 
to this discussion as the following passage from 
Peter Brent's (1972)t( Goodman of India "indicates, 
"In India . . . a range of behaviour is permitted 
which stretches well over the borders of what we 
would call madness. As a result, the schizoid and 
the paranoic have an area within society in 
which they can operate and usefully connect 
with their fellow citizens. This is not to say that 
they [are] tolerated for [their] supposed 
innocence, but rather that the ideas society has 
about the cosmos can accommodate a vast 
number of assumptions of omnipotence, obses-
sions, eccentricities, distortions of perception..." 
" We give our mad no opportunity to compromise 
with their delusions; instead we put them behind 
walls as if to drive them farther into their 
personal universe. But the Indian remains and 
finds his delusions accepted, part of a common 
mythology." 
"In contrast to the Indian, our concept of 
'reality' seems very narrow, narrower than that 
held by the majority of the people in the 
world..." 
Burton Blatt (1973) expresses his views along these 
lines as well, 
"In the beginning, humans were created, and 
then humans created criteria for being human.., 
Then humans discovered their hands and their 
fingers . . . and sought new understandings of 
themselves, their relationships with others and 
with a higher being." 
"And all the while, criteria and new criteria were 
invented and stipulated, first to classify, then to 
separate and set aside..." 
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"People with special characteristics — the blind, 
the deaf, the retarded, the special for a time, or 
the special irrespective of time or culture — 
became consistent targets for those who would 
separate one human being from another." 
From these passages and from our own 
observations, it is clear that our view of normality 
does remain relatively narrow, and that the 
definition of therapy with greatest currency is still 
the traditional form which directs its focus of 
treatment at the individual. It is this view of 
therapy which the therapeutic recreation 
movement combines with the concept of recreation 
and applies in a wide variety of settings to the 
disabled. Before analysing the main elements of 
therapeutic recreation, some brief comments 
should be made about the state of recreation in 
Australia. Recreation is not new to mankind. 
In one form or another, human beings have always 
been at play; have always taken time to do the 
things which please and fulfil them; have always 
spent their leisure hours in what we call recreation. 
Recreation as a pursuit is not new, but in Australia 
as a social discipline, as a profession, it is- a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The catch cry 
"recreation for all" is seen by voluntary agencies, 
by government and by commercial interest as 
being a worthy and achievable goal. It is also seen 
by citizens, young and old, as being an integral r)art 
of what we glibly call "the leisure age". In other 
words, recreation now has the sociological status 
of an institution. What was once a private and 
personal matter has become an issue of public 
concern, and as with other social institutions, 
standards have been set and ideal levels of 
participation promoted to all sections of the 
community. 
RECREATION AND THE DISABLED 
What of those we collectively refer to as the 
'handicapped'. Those individuals who, by the 
possession of some physical or mental disability, 
are rendered at a disadvantage in making use of the 
opportunities offered by society for participation, 
satisfaction and achievement. Does "recreation for 
all" cover this group as well? If so, what account 
must be taken of their being handicapped before 
the payoffs, expected of recreation can be realized 
for that group? Certainly, when faced with such a 
question we would agree that recreation is the right 
of all, but it is my observation and experience that, 
for the handicapped, we fulfil the promise of 
recreation in word only, not in spirit. 
In Australia, care of the handicapped is 
dominated by the medical model. There are 
exceptions, but, by and large, habilitation is the 
aim and therapy is the strategy. Residential insti-
tutions are frequently referred to as hospitals. The 
bedroom is the ward. The standard mode of 
transportation is the ambulance. The day to day 
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status of the handicapped individual is not 
'resident' but 'patient'. All aspects of life fall within 
one treatment mode or another. We do not seem to 
recognise that, however severely handicapped an 
individual may be, there are some aspects of his or 
her life which simply are not available for therapy. 
One such aspect, I will maintain, is the right to 
recreate in one's own way; and within limitations 
which one must accept for one's self. In saying this, 
I do not deny that for many disabled, individual 
therapy performs a valuable and necessary 
function. But I do maintain that recreation cannot, 
by definition, be a matter of therapy, and must not, 
if one of the last frontiers of privacy of the disabled 
person is to remain intact. 
If the concept of recreation is analysed, three 
different elements can be identified. The first is the 
recreation outcome. This is primarily subjective 
and can be better described by the term "the leisure 
attitude". Although I am sometimes interested in 
achieving certain objective results from my 
recreation experience, for example increase in 
certain skills, it is still true that the hallmark of 
recreation is the way I feel about my activity. This 
feeling or attitude is one which says that in time 
which is not otherwise committed, I will achieve 
things and enjoy experiences which are pleasing 
and satisfying to me, for my own reasons. I may 
share these experiences with others and I may 
agree to act within certain limitations, but it is my 
attitude to recreation that is central, and this 
attitude is largely one of self-satisfaction. 
The second element can be labelled focus. This 
simply demands that recreation is not undirected 
(the focus of recreation is often referred to as the 
"activity" but this term does tend to imply physic-
ally active pursuits — thus preference for the term 
"focus"). In recreation we do have a goal, however 
Loosely defined and flexibly employed. Our interest 
and action is directed towards some consciously 
identified focus, the pursuit of which we expect will 
result in the desired sense of satisfaction or 
achievement. It is also true of recreation that its 
focus is interchangeable on the basis of how we 
feel. There may of course be limitations on the 
number of choices we can make — economic, legal 
or moral, to name but a few — but in theory, at 
least, the focus is interchangeable on the basis of its 
subjective outcome. 
The third element intrinsic to the concept of 
recreation is the process of choice. This element is 
crucial as recreation demands a freedom, albeit 
relative, to change, modify and adjust one's goals. 
It is clear that the process must rest with the 
recreating individual. It cannot be vested in anyone 
else. If I recreate, I must have the right and the 
opportunity to choose. As stated above, this 
analysis does not claim that choice in recreation is 
unlimited. In considering the disabled, those 
limitations may be substantial, even overwhelming, 
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but the principle remains intact. In recreation, the 
choice within whatever limitations may obtain, 
must remain with the individual. 
A similar analysis under the headings of 
outcome, focus and choice can also be applied to 
the concept of therapy. Firstly, under the heading 
of outcome, it is right to claim that therapy must be 
"good for the patient". Certainly I choose 
recreational pursuits because they are good for me; 
but good for me in a purely subjective sense —what 
makes me feel good, feel satisfied and fulfilled. 
Therapy may be good in this sense as well, but 
primarily it is good in an objective sense. In the last 
analysis, therapy must be good independently of 
the feelings or attitudes of the individual on whom 
it is practised. The distinction is a fine one but it is 
nevertheless present. Objective therapy, to be 
effective, must certainly take account of the 
individual's subjective state, but most essentially 
its goodness is in its objectivity. For recreation, 
goodness is primarily in its subjectivity. 
Therapy also contains the element of focus or 
activity and in many cases, the activity of therapy is 
quite indistinguishable from many activities 
undertaken as recreation. In therapy, the focus is 
also interchangeable but on the basis of its 
objective, not its subjective effects. The focus of 
therapy is deliberately chosen because it is 
expected that certain benefits to the individual will 
accrue. In recreation the same applies, but a 
change can be made in recreation mid-stream with 
the expectation that the same, or similar sat-
isfactions, will be forthcoming for the recreator. 
In recreation, I may choose sewing or swimming 
with the expectation of achieving a desired state of 
relaxation and enjoyment. In therapy it is unlikely 
that sewing and swimming can be interchanged in 
the same way in order to achieve the same objective 
end. 
The third element, choice, is also shared by the 
two concepts. In therapy, however, the choice must 
lie with the therapist. Under the medical model, the 
therapist makes certain decisions or choices on 
behalf of the individual, which are designed to 
achieve certain ends with which the individual 
concurs. The individual may agree with the choice 
but does not — in fact, cannot—make the choice. 
Of course therapy may continue to the point at 
which the individual is able to make appropriate 
decisions. Nevertheless, such decisions must be 
made on the basis of the objective outcome of 
therapy, rather than of the type made in recreation, 
which has a subjective outcome in view. 
These distinctions may be represented dia-
gramatically as shown in figure 1. 
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Out-
come 
Focus 
Choice 
Objective Subjective 
(attitude secondary) (attitude primary) 
interchangeable in 
terms of objective 
effect 
rests with the 
therapist 
interchangeable in 
terms of subjective 
effect 
rests with the 
individual 
FIGURE 1 
Now, what is the effect of combining these 
concepts of therapy and recreation into the now 
well-known term of therapeutic recreation? 
If therapeutic recreation, means no more than 
recreation for the hospitalised and disabled, then 
there is no argument. But the term does mean more 
than that. The following definitions of therapeutic 
recreation clearly embody an attempt at synthesis 
between the concepts of therapy and recreation. 
However, this attempt does not work, simply 
because the final result does not embody the 
essence of recreation. 
Definition 1 — Frye (1972) 
"Therapeutic Recreation is a process through 
which purposeful efforts are directed toward 
achieving or maximising desired concomitant 
effects of a recreation experience. 
Definition 2 — Avedon (1970) 
"Therapeutic Recreation is a matrix of assistance 
calculated to contribute to the modification and 
amelioration of the inhibiting disorder'*. 
Definition 3 — Sheridan (1976) 
"Therapeutic Recreation can be described as an 
outgrowth of (1) society's use of recreation to 
prevent dysfunction which results from lack of 
opportunities for recreation experience amongst 
special groups; and (2) the use of traditional 
recreation activity in the treatment of any illness 
or disability". 
Definition 4 — Rusalem (1973) 
(A statement about therapeutic recreation) 
"In therapeutic recreation, the medium used to 
effect change is selected leisure activities and 
experiences." 
The first two definitions, those of Frye and 
Avedon, emphasise the beneficial effects of 
therapeutic recreation. The second two definitions, 
those of Sheridan and the statement by Rusalem, 
stress the use of particular activities in achieving 
the desired effect. These two emphases embody, to 
my way of thinking, the key to the failure of 
therapeutic recreatiion in its attempt to link the 
two concepts. To take first of all the thrust of the 
first two definitions; that is the emphasis on 
beneficial effects. 
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We are familiar with the use of the term therapy 
to describe the beneficial effects of some forms of 
treatment. A wide range of professions, largely 
medical and allied health, are included within what 
could be described as the therapeutic model, all of 
them having, as their aim, the general improvement 
of the lot of the individual from one point of view 
or another. This use of the term therapy will be 
designated by the capital T \ There is however 
another sense in which the term therapy is used and 
that is the everyday sense of what makes me feel 
good, what is in a very general way 'good for me*. 
We say of the jog around the block in the morning 
that it is 'therapeutic' — we would say the same of a 
plunge into an icy pool after a sauna, or of a game 
of tennis. In fact, this term has such wide currency 
as to be applied to almost any personally satisfying 
experience. 
In this sense, recreation is certainly therapeutic. 
In fact, the application of the term in this sense is so 
widespread that we do not have to attach the term 
therapy to the use of the word recreation; its sense 
is implied and fully accepted. It is clear from this 
distinction that the first two definitions, in applying 
the concept of beneficial effect, use as their 
reference point the definition of Therapy related to 
the medical model, rather than the definition of 
therapy which is related to recreation. 
In the second two definitions, there is an 
emphasis upon the use of activity. Throughout our 
lives, we engage in many different activities and 
each of these activities play a different role for us 
depending upon the context in which they are 
undertaken. For example, a craft teacher can use 
weaving as a job; the same activity can be used for 
others as a form of recreation; and thirdly it can be 
used in the Therapeutic sense to promote small 
muscle co-ordination. 
A second example would be the use of physical 
exercise. For the physical education teacher, 
exercise is part of the job; for another exercise in 
the form of jogging or circuit training can be a form 
of recreation. There is also the third application of 
using exercise to strengthen muscle groups as part 
of a rehabilitation programme. Even the major 
sports can be seen in this light. For example, 
swimming for professional swimmers entering 
international competition is different to swimming 
as a recreation, and these two are different again 
from the use of the activity swimming as a Therapy, 
for example, for asthmatic children. In each case, 
the activity is the same but its context is different 
and thus its effect changes from one situation to 
another. The two definitions which use activity in 
describing therapeutic recreation do so quite 
clearly in the third and Therapeutic sense, not as 
recreation. 
Now, in applying this analysis of therapeutic 
recreation to the original distinctions made in the 
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above chart between Therapy and recreation, it 
can be seen that Frye and Avedon are using the 
beneficial effect or outcome in therapeutic recreat-
ion in the objective sense demanded by the definit-
ion of Therapy, rather than in the subjective sense 
embodied in the definition of recreation. Similarly, 
the definitions of Sheridan and Rusalem place the 
use of activity within the Therapeutic definition 
rather than within that applying to recreation. 
The third element, the concept of choice now 
remains to be dealt with. This concept, as such, 
does not appear in definitions of therapeutic 
recreation, but it is dealt with by such workers as 
O'Morrow (1976) in their description of the 
therapeutic recreation process. O'Morrow states 
that: 
". . . the therapeutic recreation specialist should 
designate possible activities for each behavioural 
problem. This requires that the specialist know 
which activity is appropriate for a dependent, a 
semi-dependent or independent member; which 
is appropriate for an acutely ill, a chronically ill, 
a convalescent or an aged member," 
In this statement, it is clear that O'Morrow views 
the process of choice to be a function of the 
therapeutic recreation specialist. It is the therapist 
who makes the choice because it is the therapist 
who knows what activities will achieve the desired 
outcome. This is consistent with other findings 
from the analysis of the concept of therapeutic 
recreation. 
In analysing the concept, it is clear that thera-
peutic recreation is based upon the Therapeutic 
model. In fact, it is none other than a Therapeutic 
process and the only concession it allows to 
recreation is the use of some techniques of the 
recreationalist, and many activities which are 
commonly labelled recreational. However, we have 
seen that such activities are not intrinsically either 
recreational or Therapeutic but have the potential 
for either outcome, depending upon the context in 
which they are applied. Activities themselves form 
a necessary but certainly not sufficient condition 
for either recreation or Therapy. The way they 
have been applied in the field of therapeutic 
recreation is clearly under the guidelines dictated 
by Therapy. 
Now, the problem is not that the process of 
therapeutic recreation is inappropriate to the 
disabled. There is no doubt that, in many cases, 
it makes a valuable if not an essential contribution 
to the lives of those to whom it is applied. The 
problem lies in the assumption that therapeutic 
recreation will facilitate the outcomes of recreation 
for the disabled in the same way as our recreation 
does for us. But if therapeutic recreation is applied 
according to the Therapy model, then this result 
does not automatically accrue. In fact, what we 
have in many cases is a programme called 
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recreation which is based upon the need to do 
something good for the individual, to select 
activities which will have a beneficial effect and to 
assume that the therapeutic recreatio.na.list, in 
working with the disabled, is in the best position to 
make the recreational choices. Well, that's not the 
case with the non-disabled — the so-called normal 
population. In large part, the recreation of the non-
disabled is a very private and personal matter. 
Most people do those things in recreation which 
make them feel good, which bring to them 
personally important feelings, which give them 
opportunities for achievement not accruing in 
other areas of life. 
It was proposed earlier in this paper that 
recreation was the right of all, and that the disabled 
must be considered to be part of that 'air. It is clear 
that, from the above analysis, at best therapeutic 
recreation is in danger of not being able to fulfil 
this role to the same extent that recreation 
programmes do for the non-disabled; and at worst, 
that the existence of the field of therapeutic 
recreation lulls us into a sense of satisfaction that 
the disabled really are being catered for in this area, 
that they can in fact have the opportunities we have 
for exercising choice in their own regard, of 
pursuing just those activities which are most 
meaningful to them and for having access to those 
personal feelings of satisfaction which are so 
important to the non-disabled population. 
There certainly are problems in applying this 
definition of recreation to the disabled. For ex-
ample, to what extent are severely and profoundly 
retarded people capable of the process of choice; 
and just how meaningful is a wide range of 
recreational options to a quad raplegic. Although 
these difficulties exist, I believe the principle must 
remain intact, and that the area of recreation is an 
aspect of the life of the disbled which is simply not 
available for Therapy. 
The focus of the argument this far has been to 
show what differences exist between Therapy and 
recreation, and why therapeutic recreation, due to 
these differences, must be considered as an 
internally inconsistent concept. The view of 
recreation argued above is one which takes account 
of disability, but only in as much as it presents the 
recreating individual with a limitation to his or her 
activity. Recreation, in this view, accepts the 
disability and does not, as with Therapy, attempt 
to modify it in any direct or primary way. 
Recreation's task is to give the individual the 
opportunity for deciding that which will give a 
sense of satisfaction and enjoyment and to provide 
the opportunities to make that possible. For this 
process to succeed we must assume that the 
individual can recreate NOW — not at some later 
date when some changes have been made. Thus in 
recreation, the disability itself must be considered a 
constant. 
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As a recreationalist, I cannot concern myself 
with the disability except in as much as it imposes 
limitations on recreational opportunities. My con-
cern is with the individual who happens to possess 
a substantially disabling condition., I am not 
insensitive to the need for treatment of the primary 
disability and I am aware that some so-called 
recreational activities often prove very valuable in 
treatment, but if we have an aim of modifying the 
primary disability then we must, broadly speaking, 
follow a Therapeutic model. To do this will 
necessarily deny some of the basic tenets of 
recreation. This distinction is made clear by 
Paul Haun (1971) in debating the legitimacy of 
therapeutic recreation. He says: 
"The hospital recreation worker performs many 
services essential in my opinion, to the welfare of 
the patient. I cannot, however, regard any of 
them as therapeutic, first because I have never 
been convinced that recreation in any of its 
forms is a specific instrument for the modifi-
cation of a disease process . . . [and\ second, 
because I am so fully persuaded of the . . . 
patient's need for recreation as recreation I 
grudge any dilution of its potency through 
adulteration with alternative purposes." 
Haun claims that recreation is a pure and basic 
process as it is, and that to place it within the 
medical model, as the therapeutic recreation 
movement does, is not a helpful exercise. Handi-
capped people can recreate, and they can recreate 
now, albeit with limitations. 
Therapeutic recreation is based on a medical 
model which demands changes to recreation which 
remove from it some of its essential elements — the 
subjectivity of its purpose, the interchangeability 
of its focus, and most importantly the locus of 
choice. I contend that not only is this unnecessary 
but it is also a process which will force continuing 
dependence upon people for whom independence, 
however slight, is of vital importance. Dignity is 
not lost by being dependent, but by remaining 
dependent when that need not be the case. 
Recreation gives the opportunity of independent 
decision-making, and with that independence 
comes the dignity we have as human beings. 
In recreation we have needs which require 
satisfaction. The awareness of those needs and the 
desire for satisfaction is the motivational force 
behind our drive for fulfilment through recreat-
ional experiences. In a variety of social and 
physical situations, the recreationalist's aim is to 
enable the disabled individual to practise this 
process of self-awareness, to understand albeit to 
begin with at a simple level, the consequences of 
choice. These are the fundamentals of recreation. 
They are personal matters, individual matters, and 
are not open to manipulation if they are to remain 
intact as the private property of the individual. 
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Therapy, and recreation, are for ail people 
distinct process. For the disabled, that distinction 
must remain even though both must often proceed 
together throughout the whole of life. 
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